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THE PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE*
Basil D. Stapleton];
Introduction
The principal purpose of this study is to analyze the nature 
and effects of the presumption of undue influence. Before entering 
upon that analysis, however, it will be of value to make several 
general observations which should serve the dual purpose of focusing 
attention upon some of the significant characteristics of the subject 
matter and of drawing attention away from some irrelevant, albeit 
related, matters which might tend to obfuscate the question in hand.
In the first place, undue influence by reason of which courts 
of equity interfere to set aside an agreement must be distinguished 
from duress for which an agreement may be set aside at common 
law as well. Duress is the compulsion under which a person acts 
through fear of personal sufferings to himself or to another arising 
out of actual or threatened bodily restraint or injury.1 Undue 
influence, on the other hand, is essentially an abuse of confidence2 
that does not bear the mark of actual or threatened physical harm.3
Secondly, the basis of the jurisdiction which the courts of 
equity exercise to grant relief in cases of undue influence is con­
structive fraud. An agreement could be set aside because of actual 
fraud both at law and in equity; but equity extended its jurisdiction 
by including under the head of fraud transactions which were so 
opposed to fair dealings between the parties that they ought not 
to be held binding.4
Constructive fraud is simply a term applied to a great variety of 
transactions, having little resemblance either in form or in nature, 
which equity regards as wrongful, to which it attributes the same or 
similar effects as those which follow from actual fraud, and for which 
it gives the same or similar relief as that granted in cases of real fraud.
It covers different grades of wrong. It embraces contracts illegal, and 
therefore void at law as well as in equity; transactions voidable in 
equity because contrary to public policy; and transactions which merely 
raise a presumption o f wrong, and throw upon the party benefited the 
burden o f proving his innocence and the absence o f fault.*
* This essay was prepared for the seminar on Restitution.
X Basil D. Stapleton, III Law, U.N.B. Mr. Stapleton is a Sir James Dunn 
scholar in Law.
1 Halsbury's Laws o f England (3rd ed., Vol. 14), p. 479.
2 Sheridan, Fraud in Equity (1956), p. 87.
3 The meaning of “undue influence” is considered at length below.
4 Nocton v. Lord Ashburton, [1914] A.C. 932 (H.L.), at p. 953, per Lord 
Haldane, L.C.
5 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence'(5th ed., Vol. 3, 1941), p. 626 (italics mine)
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Thirdly, the existence of undue influence is a question o f fact, 
and an appellate court will not interfere with the findings o f the 
trial judge on such an issue if they are reasonably warranted by 
the evidence.6 It would appear, however, that an appellate court 
will be much less hesitant in reversing a finding that the facts were 
such as to give rise to a presumption of undue influence.7
The fourth general observation is that the cases in which trans­
actions have been set aside on the ground of undue influence fall 
into two categories: (1) where the court has been satisfied that 
the conveyance was the result of influence expressly used by the 
party benefited thereby for that purpose; and (2) where the relations 
between the parties have been such as to raise a presumption that 
the party benefited thereby has influence over the other at or shortly 
before the time of the transaction.8 It is with the latter category 
that this paper is concerned.
Further, it is to be noted that the presumption arises in rela­
tion to contracts and gifts inter vivos but does not apply to testa­
mentary dispositions. Winder9 explains that distinction as arising 
from the fact that courts of probate took over the terminology 
of the Court of Chancery but used it to express a different principle. 
Thus, the influence vitiating a testamentary act must amount to 
force and coercion destroying free agency. Undue influence in the 
ordinary sense is not sufficient and there is no presumption of 
undue influence in respect of a testator even if he is a member of 
one of the protected classes known to equity.10 Canadian11 and 
American12 courts have adopted this distinction.
6 Brett v. Brett, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 539 (Alta. C.A.).
7 Bradley et al. v. Crittenden, [1932] S.C.R. 552.
8 Allcard v. Skinner (1887), 36 Ch. D. 145 (C.A.), at p. 171, per Cotton L.J.
9 Winder, “Undue influence in English and Scots Law” (1940), 56 L.Q.R. 97, 
at p. 106.
10 Hindson v. Weatherhill (1854), 5 De. G. M. & G. 301 (solicitor and client); 
Parfitt v. Lawless (1872), L.R. 2 P. & D. 462 (chaplain-confessor and 
penitent).
11 Riach v. Ferris, [1935] 1 D.L.R. 118 (Can. Sup. Ct.), at pp. 127-8; [1934] 
S.C.R. 725, at pp. 735-6. And see an interesting case comment in (1938),
16 Can. Bar Rev. 405. See also Bohan et al. v. Walker (1927-8), 54 N.B.R. 
379, at pp. 393-4, per LeBlanc J.: “There seems however to be a distinction 
in the application of the rule [that is, the presumption of undue influence] 
between gifts inter vivos and a donatio mortis causa. The former is irrevocable 
and strips the donor of his property in his lifetime whereas a donatio mortis 
causa, like a legacy, is revocable.”
12 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed., Vol. 3, 1941), p. 781. And see the 
case comment in (1900-1), 14 Harv. Law Rev. 73.
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Finally, it would be wise, as we proceed, to keep this admonition 
in mind:
The law of undue influence at first sight seems easy, but it is in 
reality one of the most difficult branches of equity, firstly, because 
psychological considerations must enter into the matter, and secondly, 
because it requires a most minute analysis of every circumstance before 
we can see in which category it falls, and where, consequently, the 
burden of proof falls.u
The Presumption: In General
This part contains an analysis of the nature of the presumption 
of undue influence. It may be useful, therefore, to attempt to define 
the terms “ presumption” and “ undue influence” .
A “ presumption” is a deduction from a known or ascertained 
fact, or, as the old writers expressed it, “ex eo quod plerumque Jit" .14 
It is raised either by the law or by the judge. That which is raised 
by the law or so established as proved admits nothing to the con­
trary and cannot be repelled. This presumption is called “juris et 
de jure". That presumption which is raised by the judge is usually 
called a “praesumptio hominis” , and always admits of proof to the 
contrary.15 By and large, the presumption with which we are here 
concerned is of the latter type.16
In 1887, Lindley L.J. stated that, “ As no Court has ever at­
tempted to define fraud so no Court has ever attempted to define 
undue influence, which includes one of its many varieties” .17 This 
statement contains a distinct note of caution which should not go 
unheeded. However, the following definition may prove of some 
value:
It [undue influence] may be defined as the unconscientious use 
by one person of power possessed by him over another in order to 
induce the other to enter into a contract [or make a gift].18
This may be supplemented by a statement from Pomeroy.
\Vhere there is no coercion amounting to duress, but a trans­
action is the result of a moral, social, or domestic force exerted upon
13 Hanbury, Modern Equity (4th ed., 1946), p. 680.
14 Clark v. The King (1921), 61 S.C.R. 608, at p. 629, per Mignault J.
15 Campbell v. Barrie (1871), 31 U.C.Q.B. 279 (C.A.), at p. 288, per Wilson J.
16 Some of the earlier English decisions held the presumption arising in the 
case of a gift from a client to his solicitor to be irrebuttable. It will be 
argued below, that this is no longer good law. See footnote 78.
17 Allcard v. Skinner (1887), 36 Ch. D. 145 (C.A.), at p. 183.
18 Grisshammer v. Ungerer (1958), 14 D.L.R. (2d) 599 (Man. C.A.), at p. 600, 
per Adamson, C.J.M.
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a party, controlling the free action of his will and preventing any true 
consent, equity may relieve against the transaction, on the ground of un­
due influence, even though there may be no invalidity at law.19
Under what circumstances, then, will undue influence be pre­
sumed? The immediately preceding quotation points to the key 
factor, namely, the relationship in which the parties stood at the 
time of, or shortly before, the transaction. The question for which 
we must seek an answer, therefore, is: what is the nature of the 
relationship which gives rise to the presumption? The answers to 
this question have been variously framed depending, it would 
seem, upon the aspect of the issue which was being emphasized 
at the time.
It may be thought and, indeed, it has been said, that undue 
influence will be presumed wherever the relationship is shown to 
have been a fiduciary one.20 The inadequacy and inaccuracy o f such 
a view have, however, been clearly demonstrated. It, in the words 
of Fletcher Moulton L.J., “ illustrates in a striking form the danger 
of trusting to verbal formulae.”21 To illustrate his point the learned 
Lord Justice points out that:
Fiduciary relations are of many different types; they extend 
from the relation of myself to an errand boy who is bound to bring 
me back my change up to the most intimate and confidential relations 
which can possibly exist between one party and another where the 
one is wholly in the hands of the other because of his infinite trust 
in him.22
It is therefore absurd to conclude that every kind of fiduciary 
relation warrants application of the doctrine. “The nature of the 
fiduciary relation must be such that it justifies the interference.”23
What then is the additional necessary ingredient? These state­
ments of Fletcher Moulton L.J. suggest that a high degree of 
intimacy is required to bring the doctrine into play. What would 
appear to amount to the same view is expressed by Lord Eldon 
who, however, employs the word “confidence” rather than 
“ intimacy” .
19 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed., Vol. 3, 1941), p. 776.
20 Ibid., at p. 780: “Where an antecedent fiduciary relation exists, a court 
of equity will presume confidence placed and influence exerted; where 
there is no such fiduciary relation, the confidence and influence must be 
proved by satisfactory extrinsic evidence.” (italics mine)
21 In re Coomber, Coomber v. Coomber, [1911] 1 Ch. D. 723 (C.A.), at p. 728.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., at p. 729. See also Smith v. Kay (1859), 7 H.L.C. 750, at p. 771;
11 E.R. 299, at p. 308, per Lord Cranworth.
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It is asked, where is that rule to be found. I answer, in that great 
rule of the court, that he, who bargains in matter of advantage with 
a person placing confidence in him is bound to shew, that a reasonable 
use has been made of that confidence; a rule applying to trustees, 
attorneys, or any one else.24
The next step in our analysis is, therefore, to inquire as to the 
nature of the confidence that suffices for this purpose. In approach­
ing this question there is a noticeable tendency on the part of the 
courts to regard the solicitor-client relationship as a useful guide­
line and standard. In fact, McRuer C.J.H.C. has stated that “ It 
is also clear that wherever the relationship is akin to that of solicitor 
and client, the doctrine ought always to be applied.”25 If, then, we 
are able to discern the peculiar characteristics of this particular 
relationship we will have gained a valuable insight into the thinking 
of the courts upon the whole question before us.
In the usual case the client seeks the assistance and advice of 
the solicitor in matters on which the client is largely or totally 
uninformed. The client thus places himself in a position of de­
pendence and the solicitor in a position of influence. The significance 
of this is seen in the words of Lord Cranworth where he says that 
the presumption arises:
. . .  upon the ordinary principal of the Court, which protects an infant, 
or any other person, who is, from the relations which have subsisted 
between him and another person, under the influence, as it is called, 
of that other. My Lords, there is, I take it, no branch of the jurisdiction 
of the Court of Chancery which it is more ready to exercise than that 
which protects infants and persons in a situation of dependence, as 
it were, upon others, from being imposed upon by those upon whom 
they are so dependant. The familiar cases of the influence of a parent 
over his child, of a guardian over his ward, of an attorney over his 
client, are but instances.26
I believe, if the principle is examined, it will be found most 
frequently applied in such cases, for this simple reason, that the 
fiduciary relation gives a power of influence.27
In the words of some of the older authorities, the solicitor may 
be said to be in a position to “ exercise dominion” over his client. 
“The relief” , as Sir Samuel Romilly says, “ stands upon a general 
principle, applying to all variety of relations, in which dominion 
may be exercised by one person over another.”28 The great difficulty
24 Gibson v. Jeyes (1801), 6 Ves. Jun. 267, at p. 278; 31 E.R. 1044, at p. 1050; 
see also (1919-20), 5 Corn. L.R., at pp. 318-19.
25 Brown et al. v. Premier Trust Co. et al., 11947] 1 D.L.R. 593 (Ont. H.C.), 
at p. 606.
26 Smith v. Kay (1859), 7 H.L.C. 750, at p. 770; II E.R. 299, at p. 307.
27 Smith v. Kay (1859), 7 H.L.C. 750, at p. 771; 11 E.R. 299, at p. 308.
28 Huguenin v. Baseley (1807), 14 Ves. Jun. 274, at pp. 285-6; 33 E.R. 526, 
at p. 531.
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inherent in any attempt to establish the exact nature of this power 
is, however, clearly indicated by the Master of the Rolls in Cooke 
v. Lamotte.29
It is very difficult to lay down with precision what is meant by 
the expression ‘relation in which dominion may be exercised by one 
person over another’. That relation exists in the cases of parent, of 
guardian, of solicitor, of spiritual adviser, and of medical attendant, 
and may be said to apply to every case in which two persons are so 
situated, that one may obtain considerable influence over the other.30
One would assume that the marked tendency to proceed by 
way of analogy from the solicitor-client relationship has been 
induced primarily by the fact that it is the confidential, influence- 
producing relationship with which judges are most familiar. It is 
this high degree of familiarity that enables them to presume that 
in such a relationship the necessary confidence will have been 
reposed and that, as a consequence, the solicitor stood in a position 
of “considerable influence” vis-a-vis the client. Once that much has 
been presumed the next step, that of presuming that any benefit 
derived by the solicitor from a transaction between the parties was 
obtained by the undue exercise of such influence, is an “easy” 
one.31 In fact, it is automatic. Looked at in this way the problem 
becomes one of determining the types of relationships where the 
courts possess sufficient experience32 and adequate knowledge to 
enable them to say that such a relationship is normally characterized 
by the existence of “ that type of confidence” and “ that kind of 
influence” which warrant the presumptions. An analysis of the 
types of relationships that fall into this category will be made later. 
Suffice it to say at this point that where such a relationship is shown 
to have existed at the relevant time the dual presumptions are raised.
Where, on the other hand, the relationship was not such as 
to give the plaintiff the benefit of the presumption of confidence 
reposed and influence acquired, he has to prove these things as 
facts in order to raise the presumption of undue influence. For 
this purpose the plaintiff must produce satisfactory extrinsic evidence. 
The type of evidence that is likely to be of greatest avail to the plaintiff 
is that which tends to indicate a high degree of dependence on his 
part with the attendant position of domination on the part of the 
defendant. Thus, circumstances indicating the inferiority of the 
plaintiff’s “ bargaining” position are useful. Such circumstances 
include old or tender age, physical or mental infirmity, financial 
distress, illiteracy, ignorance of business affairs, ignorance of property
29 (1851), 15 Beav. 234; 51 E.R. 527.
30 Cooke v. Lamotte (1851), 15 Beav. 234, at p. 240; 51 E.R. 527, at p. 530.
31 The sense in which this step is an “easy” one is discussed below.
32 Clarke v. Hawke (1865), 11 Gr. 527, at p. 544.
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rights and values, humbleness o f social station, poverty and eccen­
tricity.33 One might expect, o f course, to find two or more o f these 
present in a particular case. It must be emphasized, however, that 
the mere showing o f such conditions o f weakness does not neces­
sarily bring the doctrine into play. For it is only by establishing to  
the court’s satisfaction the necessary dependence-domination rela­
tionship that the plaintiff can acquire the advantage o f the presum p­
tion. He can enhance his position considerably by showing that 
the transaction was a most improvident one, the kind o f transaction 
that would probably only be entered into by a person over whom 
influence was unduly exercised.34 His cause will be advanced as 
well by a showing that he did not have independent advice at the 
relevant time. In Fry v. Lanei5 Kay J. said:
The result o f the decisions is that where a purchase is made from 
a poor and ignorant man at a considerable undervalue, the vendor 
having no independent advice, a Court of Equity will set aside the 
transaction . . .  The circumstances o f poverty and ignorance of the 
vendor, and the absence o f independent advice, throw upon the 
purchaser, when the transaction is impeached, an onus o f proving, 
in Lord Selborn’s words, that the purchase was “fair, just, and 
reasonable” .
It is worth risking repetition to emphasize that in seeking to 
gain the benefit o f the presum ption the plaintiff is not required to 
show any actual fraud or wrong-doing o f any sort by the defendant. 
Indeed, the impugned transaction may have been quite untainted. 
This fact will not prevent the doctrine from being applied, however, 
once the appropriate relationship has been satisfactorily proved.36
33 Kerr on Fraud and Mistake  (7th ed., 1952), pp. 225-6, cited in McElroy v. 
Woods e t al. (1964), 45 D.L.R. (2d) 379, at p. 389. And see Sheridan, 
Fraud in Equity (1956), at pp. 80-84.
34 The insufficiency o f this fact alone, however, is clearly indicated by Lindley 
L.J., in these words: “Courts o f  Equity have never set aside gifts on the 
ground of the folly, imprudence, or want o f foresight on the part o f  
donors . . .  It would obviously be to encourage folly, recklessness, extra­
vagance and vice if persons could get back property which they foolishly 
made away with, whether by giving it to charitable institutions or by 
bestowing it on less worthy objects.” Allcard v. Skinner (1887), 36 Ch.
D. 145 (C.A.), at pp. 182-3. At a later point in the same judgment, however, 
the learned Lord Justice observed that: “ . . .  if the gift is so large as not 
to be reasonably accounted for on the ground o f friendship, relationship, 
charity, or other ordinary motives on which ordinary men act, the burden 
is upon the donee to support the gift.” Ibid, at p. 185.
35 (1888), 40 Ch. D. 312, at p. 322.
36 In Allcard v. Skinner (1887), 36 Ch. D. 145 (C.A.), Lindley L.J. set aside 
a gift because of the unrebutted presumption in spite o f the fact that: 
“ In this particular case I cannot find any proof that any gift made by the 
plaintiff was the result o f any actual exercise o f power or influence on 
the part o f the lady superior or o f Mr. Nihill, apart from the influence 
necessarily incidental to their position in the sisterhood.” Ibid., at p. 183.
U.N.B. LAW  JOURNAL 53
One can readily see, therefore, that it can work a considerable 
hardship on an innocent defendant. The reasons why the courts 
are prepared to run this risk are examined later.
Some Relationships Giving Rise to the Presumption
This section is devoted to an analysis o f some o f the more 
com m on types of relationships that give rise to the presumption. It 
is by no means intended as an exhaustive survey. Rather it is hoped 
that the few examples discussed will help to clarify the foregoing 
general propositions and enable us to gain a greater insight into 
the nature o f the confidence, dependence, superiority and influence 
around which the doctrine is centered.
(a) Solicitor and Client:
In Wright v. Carter37 it was laid down that a gift by a client 
to his solicitor raises the presum ption o f undue influence because 
o f the fiduciary relation subsisting between them, and the onus 
is on the solicitor to prove that the donor in making the gift was 
uninfluenced by that relation. Furtherm ore, Demerara Bauxite Co. 
v. Hubbard38 shows tha t the presum ption is not destroyed merely 
by the term ination o f the relation o f solicitor and client in a strict 
sense, but continues as long as the confidence naturally arising from 
the old relation is proved, or may be presumed, to continue.
The presumption against dealings for value is more restricted. 
It does not apply where the solicitor buys property from, or makes 
some other bargain with his client, in respect o f which no confidence 
is resposed and in respect o f which the solicitor has no special 
knowledge.39 That is not to say, however, that a solicitor is free 
from the doctrine in respect o f all transactions not involving m atters 
that he is specifically employed by his client to look after. The test 
is well stated by Parker J. in Allison v. Clayhills:40
In considering whether this onus lies upon him, the test appears 
to me to be the proper answer to the question whether in the particular 
transaction, he owes his client any duty in the contemplation o f a 
court o f  equity. If he owes his client any duty in the particular trans­
action, the equal footing on which the parties to any bargain should 
stand is impaired or destroyed, and the solicitor is, I think, solicitor 
in hac re within the meaning of the decisions although not retained 
to act as solicitor in the transaction or, indeed, in any pending trans­
action at all.
37 [1903] 1 Ch. 27.
38 [1923] A.C. 673.
39 Montesquieu v. Sandys (1811), 18 Ves. 302, at p. 313; 34 E.R. 331, at p. 335.
40 (1907), 97 L.T. 709, at pp. 711-12, cited in Sheridan, Fraud in Equity (1956), 
pp. 91-2.
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(b) Doctor and Patient:
D octor and patient is another such relationship.41 In Dent v. 
Bennett42 a medical attendant obtained from his patient, who was 
eighty-five years o f age, an agreement to pay him £25,000 for 
services completed two years before, the regular charge for which 
had been previously paid. This agreement was executed privately, 
w ithout the intervention of any third party, and carefully concealed 
until after the patient’s death. It is instructive to note the words 
used by Lord C ottenham  in setting aside the agreem ent:
. . .  and when I find an agreement, so extravagant in its provisions, 
secretly obtained by a medical attendant from his patient, o f very 
advanced age, and carefully concealed from his professional advisors 
and all other persons, and have it proved that the habits, views, and 
intentions o f the testator were wholly inconsistent with those pro­
visions, I cannot but come to the conclusion that the medical attendant 
did obtain it by some dominion exercised over the patient.
. . .  The relation does not cease because the patient has not medicine 
actually administered to him at the time, any more than the relation 
of attorney and client ceases because no suit may be actually in progress.
If it were otherwise, 1 do not know that it would have made any • 
difference; but 1 think that the existence o f the relation of medical 
attendant and patient is not only proved by the evidence, but by the 
very agreement itself.43
(c) Trustee and Beneficiary:
In Brown et al v. Premier Trust Co. et al.,44 in the O ntario 
High C ourt, a solicitor, acting in that capacity, who was also general 
m anager o f a trust company, consulted in 1934 with an elderly 
doctor and his wife concerning their wills and advised them o f the 
advantages o f having a trust com pany handling their affairs and 
acting as executor o f their estates. By the beginning o f 1935 he had 
established himself in the couple’s confidence qua solicitor and trust 
com pany manager, and they decided (the doctor’s health being 
bad) to tu rn  over their affairs to the trust com pany and to act 
on the solicitor’s advice in making their wills. Contem poraneously 
the solicitor entered into a contract with the doctor for the sale 
to him o f a block o f speculative com m on shares o f the trust company 
and this transaction required the conversion o f more than half o f 
the doctor’s assets which were in the form o f high-class securities. 
The doctor died in 1938 and his beneficiaries succeeded in an action 
commenced in 1945 to have the transaction set aside. M cRuer
C .J.H .C . based his decision on the ground that the doctor was
41 Billage v. Southee (1852), 9 Hare 534; 68 E.R. 623. And see M itchell v. 
Homfray (1881), 8 Q.B.D. 587.
42 (1838), 4 My. & Cr. 269; 41 E.R. 105.
43 (1838), 4 My. & Cr. 269, at pp. 277-8; 41 E.R. 105, at pp. 108-9.
44 [1947] 1 D.L.R. 593.
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wholly dependant upon the defendants in seeking advice on his 
investments and th a t the defendants from their relation to him, 
were in a position to exercise “ deeprooted influence over him ” . 
The defendants having chosen to mix the confidential relationship 
with that o f  vendor o f shares, when the propriety o f the transaction 
is called in question, the onus is on them to establish its perfect 
fairness and equity.45
(d) Religious Adviser and Devotee:
The leading case in this area is Allcard v. Skinner,46 the facts of 
which are as follows:
In 1868 the plaintiff, a woman about thirty-five years o f  age, was 
introduced by her spiritual adviser, one Nihill, to the defendant, 
who was the lady superior o f a Protestant institution known as “The 
Sisters o f The Poor” . Nihill was the spiritual director and confessor 
o f this sisterhood. Three years later the plaintiff became a sister and 
took the vows o f poverty, chastity and obedience. The vow o f poverty 
was strict and required the absolute surrender of all individual property, 
there being no direction, however, as to whom the property was to 
be donated. The plaintiff remained a sister for eight years until 1879 
during which time she gave property to the value of about £7000 
to the sisterhood. She left the sisterhood in 1879 by which time all 
but £1,671 o f the money had been spent by the defendant upon the 
purposes o f the institution. The plaintiff took no action until 1885, 
but in that year she sued for the recovery o f the £1,671 on the ground 
that it had been procured by the undue influence o f the defendant.
The plaintiff would have succeeded had her claim not been barred 
by her laches and acquiescence after she had left the sisterhood.47 
And this is so regardless o f the fact, as found by the C ourt o f Appeal, 
that no personal pressure had been exerted on the plaintiff and no 
unfair advantage taken o f her position, but that the only explana­
tion o f the gift was her own willing submission to the vow of 
poverty.48 Nevertheless, the court held that her gifts were in fact 
made under pressure that she could not resist, she being bound 
by the rule that no sister was to seek advice from any outside person 
without the superior’s permission.
Several informative statements may be garnered from  the judg­
ments delivered in this case. For instance, Lord Justice Lindley 
observed tha t:
The influence o f one mind over another is very subtle, and of all 
influences religious influence is the most dangerous and the most 
powerful, and to counteract it Courts o f Equity have gone very far.49
45 Ibid., at pp. 606 and 610.
46 (1887), 36 Ch. D . 145 (C.A.).
47 Ibid., at p. 189.
48 Ibid., at pp. 183-4.
49 Ibid., at p. 183.
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And in delivering the trial judgm ent, Kekewich J. who decided 
in favor o f the defendant upon finding tha t the presum ption had 
been rebutted, said:
The more powerful influence or the weaker patient alike evokes a 
stronger application o f the safeguard, and there can be no case more 
urgently requiring it than one o f the influence o f a priest, director, 
or mother superior o f a convent, over an emotional woman, residing 
within the convent walls, and subject to its discipline.^
(e) Familial Relationships:
This part will conclude with a brief analysis o f some o f the 
relationships o f a family o r domestic character which give rise to 
the presumption and some which do not.
(i) Parent and Child
There is no rule o f equity that a parent o r person in loco 
parentis may not accept a benefit from his child, even when that 
child is still under parental influence, so long as the benefit is 
conferred with a deliberate and unbiassed intention. In most trans­
actions o f this type, however, a parent is presumed to have exercised 
undue influence over his child, so long as the child is underage, or 
not em ancipated from the parent’s control.51 Furtherm ore, the 
parental influence against which the courts seek to protect the 
child is not necessarily the influence arising from fear or coercion, 
but includes that from kindness and affection.52 The im portant 
thing is “ that such child is placed in such a position as will enable 
him to form an entirely free and unfettered judgm ent, independent 
altogether o f any sort o f control.53
In Lancashire Loans Ltd. v. Black54 it was said that emancipation 
from the relationship which gives rise to the exceptional influence 
possessed by a parent over a child is a question o f fact to be de­
termined on the evidence. The transaction impugned there took 
place seventeen m onths after the daughter had come o f age and 
after she had married and left her parental home. Nevertheless, it 
was held that the parental dom inion had not ceased and the trans­
action was set aside. Greer L.J. observed:
The influence arising out o f the relationship o f  mother and daughter 
is, in my judgement, one in which it is most likely that the influence 
of the mother in persuading the daughter to take a certain line o f
50 Ibid., at p. 158.
51 Wright v. Vanderplank (1856), 8 D.M . & G. 133; 44 E.R. 340; Bainbrigge 
v. Browne (1880), 18 Ch. D. 188.
52 Turner v. Collins (1871), 7 Ch. App. 329, at p. 340.
53 Archer v. Hudson (1844), 7 Beav. 551, at p. 560; 49 E.R. 1180, at p. 1183, 
per Lord Langdale, M.R.
54 [1934] 1 K.B. 380 (C.A.), at p. 421.
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action will have a greater effect, and will continue to operate for a 
longer period than in the case o f influence arising from any other 
relationship.55
The principles applicable to a parent apply to a person standing 
in loco parentis who receives a benefit from the person under his 
protection, as in cases of benefits conterred on an elder brother or 
sister, step-father, step-mother, o r uncle, standing in loco parentis, 
o r on a guardian or ex-guardian.56 In order to raise the presumption 
in such a case it would appear to be essential that a position o f 
quasi-parenthood o r guardianship be proved. The mere fact o f 
relationship by blood or marriage is irrelevant.57
It may happen that the roles may become reversed with the 
child assuming a position o f dominion over the parent or similarly 
situated person. In such a case benefits conferred upon the child 
will be presumed to have been induced by undue influence. This, 
o f course, is in accordance with the general principle applying to 
all relations wherein the party seeking to avoid the transaction is 
able to prove the necessary confidential relationship.
(ii) O ther Relationships
One would have thought the husband and wife relation to be 
a prime candidate for application o f the doctrine. Indeed, G irouard 
J. o f the Supreme Court o f C anada has said that:
Experience teaches us and the law reports establish abundantly that 
married wom en,In nearly all cases, are under the control and influence 
of their husbands and rarely can resist their mere demands and re­
quests, much less their solicitations and supplications, and that these 
generally prevail, while threat and violence seldom do.58
N either the English nor Canadian courts, however, apply the 
doctrine in such a case.59 This is probably an outgrowth o f the 
thinking underlying the general movement toward the emancipation 
o f women which began in the latter part o f the last century.60 W hat 
is, perhaps, a more practical reason is that presented by Farwell L.J.:
Upon principle, it is clear that business could not go on if in every 
transaction by way of a gift by a wife to her husband the onus were
55 Ibid., at p. 422.
56 See generally, Halsbury’s Laws o f  England (3rd ed., vol. 17), p. 679.
57 Sheridan, Fraud in Equity (1956), p. 95.
58 Cox v. Adams (1904), 35 S.C.R. 393, at p. 413.
59 The doctrine was applied to the husband and wife relation by the Supreme 
Court o f Canada in Stuart v. Bank o f  Montreal, [1908-9] S.C.R. 516, but 
on appeal the Privy Council disapproved o f the application o f the principle; 
see [1911] A.C. 120 (P.C.), at p. 126. The latter decision has been followed 
in Bank o f  Montreal v. Holoboff, [1924] 3 D.L.R. 418 (Sask. C.A.), and 
in Luchak v. Sitko  (1956), 3 D.L.R. (2d) 682 (Alta. C.A.).
60 Howes v. Bishop, [1909] 2 K.B. 390, at p. 394, per Farwell, L.J.
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on the husband to shew that the wife had had independent advice: 
such a position would render married life intolerable.6!
This seemingly anom alous non-application of the principle is 
m ade to appear even more so by the fact that it has been held to 
apply in the case o f engaged couples, a t least in regard to benefits 
conferred upon the fiance. In In re Lloyds Banks;63 M augham J. 
expressed the view that a young woman engaged to be married 
generally reposes the greatest confidence in her future husband.64 
And in Bradley v. Crittenden65 Lam ont J. was prepared to hold, in 
the circumstances of that case, that the rule applied where the 
donor and donee are not formally engaged but the donor is greatly 
in love with the donee and desires to make her his wife. All o f 
which serves to underline, if nothing else, the high degree o f un­
certainty that tends to characterize the principle in its application.
Reasons for the Presumption
They [courts of equity] have not shrunk from setting aside gifts 
made to persons in a position to exercise undue influence over the 
donors; although there has been no proof o f the actual exercise o f  
such influence, and the Courts have done this on the avowed ground 
of the necessity o f going this length in order to protect persons from 
the exercise o f such influence under circumstances which render proof 
o f it impossible.66
This statement is a fitting introduction to our present inquiry 
for two reasons. In the first place, it points directly to the primary 
m otivation behind the doctrine, namely, the protection o f de­
pendant persons. This equitable public policy is widely canvassed 
in the leading authorities.67 It is as understandable a motive as it 
is an  obvious one. On the other hand, the statement also indicates
61 Ibid., at p. 402.
62 Page v. Horne (1848), 11 Beav. 227; 50 E.R. 804; Cobbett v. Brock (1855),
20 Beav. 524; 52 E.R. 706.
63 (1930), 47 T.L.R. 38, cited in Bradley v. Crittenden, [1932] S.C.R. 552, 
at p. 566.
64 “ It may be that the rule once reflected the state of the market, which 
operated to make a girl reluctant to refuse anything to her fiance, but 
the changed social circumstances o f today render unreal this presumption, 
which ought to be dropped.” Sheridan, Fraud in Equity (1956), at p. 96.
65 [1932] S.C.R. 552, at p. 567.
66 Allcard v. Skinner (1887), 36 Ch. D. 145 (C.A.), at p. 183, per Lindley, L.J.
67 For example, Bradley et al. v. Crittenden, [1932] S.C.R. 552, at 559, per 
Duff, J.; Huguenin v. Baseley (1807), 14 Ves. Jun. 274; 33 E.R. 526, at 
p. 531, per Sir Samuel Romilly, and at p. 532, per Lord Eldon; Gibson 
v. Jeyes (1801), 6 Ves. Jun. 267; 31 E.R. 1044, at pp. 1049-50, per Lord 
Eldon; Allcard v. Skinner (1887), 36 Ch. D. 145 (C.A.), at p. 171, per  
Cotton, L.J.; and Wright v. Vanderplank (1856), 8 D .M . & G. 133, at 
p. 137; 44 E.R. 340, at p. 342, per Knight Bruce, L.J.
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that the reasons underlying the doctrine are, perhaps, not as ap ­
parent as one might have suspected. If the fact o f undue influence 
were readily provable there would be little or no reason to invoke 
the presumption. Those deserving protection could be given it and 
the public interest could be served by setting aside impeached 
transactions on a showing that influence was exercised unduly. 
Undue influence, however, is not easily proved. In fact, Lindley L.J. 
expressed the view that it may, in certain cases, be impossible to 
prove. This would appear to be because the influence is often a 
very subtle one in sharp contrast with the obviousness o f duress. 
Indeed, the parties themselves may not even be aware that such 
influence is being exerted. Such considerations help one to appre­
ciate why equity found it necessary to forge that formidable tool, 
the presum ption.68
Some definitions o f the doctrine and the reasoning behind it 
are couched in terms which indicate that some basic principles of 
contract law are not absent from the minds o f judges when they 
approach this question. It has been said, for example, that a trans­
action will be set aside on the ground o f undue influence because 
it was not the result o f the free exercise of the plaintiff’s will69 or 
because he did not enter into it voluntarily and deliberatel), knowing 
its nature and effect.70 Finally there is the frequently quoted state­
ment of Lord Eldon in Huguenin v. Baseley71 to the effect tha t it 
is not whether the dependant party had the intention o f entering 
into the transaction that is o f fundamental importance. R ather it 
is how that intention was produced.
Presumption Rebuttable
W herever the plaintiff succeeds in raising the presum ption, 
the onus of proof rests on the party who seeks to uphold the trans­
action to show that the other performed the act or entered into 
the transaction voluntarily, and deliberately, knowing its nature
68 It is o f interest to note the way in which Lord Eldon viewed the matter: 
“ It is necessary to say broadly, that those, who meddle with such trans­
actions, take upon themselves the whole proof, that the thing is righteous. 
The circumstances, that pass upon such transactions, may be consistent 
with honest intentions; but they are so delicate in their nature, that parties 
must not complain o f being called on to prove, they are so.” Gibson v. 
Jeyes (1801), 6 Ves. Jun. 267; 31 E.R. 1044, at p. 1049. “ . . .  if the Court 
does not watch these transactions with a jealousy almost invincible, in 
a great majority o f cases it will lend its assistance to fraud.” Hatch v. Hatch 
(1804), 9 Ves. Jun. 292, at p. 297; 32 E.R. 615, at 617.
69 Allcard v. Skinner (1887), 36 Ch. D. 145 (C.A.), at p. 171.
70 Kerr on Fraud and M istake (7th ed., 1952), at p. 226.
71 (1807), 14 Ves. Jun. 274, at p. 299; 33 E.R. 526, at p. 536.
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and effect, and that his consent to perform the act o r become a 
party to the transaction was not obtained by reason o f any undue 
advantage taken o f his position o r o f any undue influence exerted 
over him.72 The onus may be a very heavy one. It would appear, 
however, that it can be more easily discharged in some cases than 
in others depending, it would seem, upon the actual quality o f the 
relation,73 the size o f the benefit conferred74 and the presence or 
absence o f those other circumstances which tend to strengthen the 
presum ption.75 It would appear to be strongest in the case o f the 
solicitor receiving a gift from a client.77 Even there, however, it 
is not irrebuttable.78
In all cases where the presumption arises it would seem that 
the surest way to rebut it is by showing that the donor had inde­
pendent advice and that the confidential relationship between the 
parties had ceased at the time o f the transaction. In Allcard v. 
Skinner, Lindley L.J. seems to have thought that only by proving 
both o f these things could the onus be discharged. But this view 
is excessively severe on the defendant and does not seem to have 
gained general favour. For example, in Mitchell v. Homfray,79 Lord 
Selborne pointed out that where the confidential relation is shown 
to have come to an end no more need be shown by way of rebuttal. 
And Lord Hailsham in Inche Noriah v. A Hie Bin Omarw  expresses 
a more m oderate view by suggesting that where the relation is 
still subsisting, proof o f independent advice is only one of the 
methods by which the presumption can be rebutted. His Lordship
72 "It is necessary to say broadly, that those, who meddle with such trans­
actions take upon themselves the whole proof, that the thing is righteous.” 
Gibson v. Jeyes (1801), 6 Ves. Jun. 267; 31 E.R. 1044, at p. 1049, per Lord 
Eldon.
73 Sheridan, Fraud in Equity (1956), at p. 90.
74 Allcard v. Skinner (1887), 36 Ch. D. 145 (C.A.), at p. 185.
75 See references in footnote 32.
76 Allcard v. Skinner (1887), 36 Ch. D. 145, at p. 158, per Kekewick, J.
77 Indeed, Lord Eldon has expressed the opinion that it is almost impossible 
for a solicitor to retain such a benefit once it is impeached: see Hatch v. 
Hatch (1804), 9 Ves. Jun. 292, at p. 296; 32 E.R. 615, at p. 617.
78 In Tomson v. Judge (1855), 3 Drew. 306; 61 E.R. 920, it was held that there 
was an absolute rule that a gift by a client to his solicitor is void. This 
view was also expressed obiter in the Ontario case, Re White, Kerstan 
v. Tane (1875), 22 Gr. 547, cited in Words and Phrases, Legal Maxims, 
Canada, (2nd. ed., Vol. 5), at p. 534. However, such a view was expressly 
dissented from in Wright v. Carter, [1903] 1 Ch. D. 27. See also Brown 
et al. v. Premier Trust Co. et ul., [1947] 1 D.L.R. 593 (Ont. H.C.), at p. 607, 
per McRuer, C.J.H.C.
79 (1881), 8 Q.B.D. 587, at p. 591.
80 [1929] A.C. 127, at p. 135.
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was very much concerned with emphasizing that it is the end rather 
than the means that is o f importance.
. . .  and in cases where (here are no other circumstances this [the 
showing o f independent advice] may be the only means by which 
the donee can rebut the presumption. But the fact to be established 
is that stated in the judgement already cited o f Cotton, L. J. [that 
the gift was the result o f the free exercise o f independent will], and 
if evidence is given o f circumstances sufficient to establish this fact, 
their Lordships see no reason for disregarding them merely because 
they do not include independent advice from a lawyer.«1
At the very least, therefore, it can be said that the presumption 
o f undue influence can be rebutted by showing either that the 
confidential relation has ceased or, if it was still subsisting, that 
the plaintiff had independent advice.82 To be sufficient for this 
purpose, the independent advice must, at least, be given with a 
knowledge o f all relevant circumstances and must be such as a 
competent and honest advisor would give if acting solely in the 
interests o f the donor.83 It is not clear, however, whether it is 
necessary to show that such advice was actually followed. In Powel! 
v. Powell84 Farwell J. held that such a showing was necessary.
Further, it is not sufficient that the donor should have an inde­
pendent adviser unless he acts on his advice. If this were not so, the 
same influence that produced the desire to make the settlement would 
produce disregard of the advice to refrain from executing it, and so 
defeat the rule; but the stronger the influence the greater the need 
of protection.
However, some doubt was cast upon the validity o f this view 
by Lord Hailsham, who in the Inche Noriah case stated, in effect, 
that their Lordships were not prepared to affirm that independent 
advice, when given, does not rebut the presumption, unless it be 
shown that the advice was taken.85 It cannot be doubted, in any 
event, that the defendent’s position will be very much strengthened 
by showing that the advice was followed. In fact, such a showing 
should guarantee success.
81 Ibid.
82 Powell v. Powell, [1900] 1 Ch. 243, at pp. 245-6, per Farwell, J.: “The 
donee must show (and the onus is on him) that the donor was either 
emancipated or was placed, by the possession o f independent advice, in 
a position equivalent to emancipation.” It has been also suggested that 
a defendant may uphold a transaction for consideration by showing that 
the bargain was fair; see Sheridan, Fraud in Equity (1956), pp. 100, 104.
83 Donnelly v. Jesseau (1936), 11 M.P.R. 1 (N.B. Sup. Ct.), at pp. 8, 9, per 
Harrison, J.
84 [1900] 1 Ch. 243, at p. 246.
85 Inche Noriah v. Shaik Albe Bin Omer, [1929] A.C. 127 (P.C.), at p. 135.
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Effect of a Non-displaced Presumption
W here the defendent is unable to rebut the presum ption the 
transaction will be set aside unless some other defence is available 
to him. In this connection it is im portant to recognize against 
whom the inference o f undue influence operates. Lord Eldon laid 
down a clear and very stringent rule in this much quoted statem ent:
. . .  and I should regret, that any doubt could be entertained, whether 
it is not competent to a court o f equity to take away from third persons 
the benefits which they have derived from the fraud, imposition, or un­
due influence o f others . . .  and Lord Hardwicke observes justly, 
that, if a person could get out o f the reach o f the doctrine and principle 
o f this Court by giving interests to third persons, instead o f reserving 
them to himself, it would be almost impossible ever to reach a case 
o f fraud.
N o: whoever receives it must take it tainted and infected with 
the undue influence and imposition o f the person procuring the gift: 
his partitioning and cantoning it out amongst his relations and friends 
will not purify the gift, and protect it against the Equity o f the person 
imposed upon. Let the hand receiving it be ever so chaste, yet, if it 
comes through a polluted channel, the obligation o f restitution will 
follow .86
This rigid principle subsequently underwent some considerable 
reform ulation. The more m oderate form which it takes a t present 
is well defined by Fry J. in these words:
Clearly it [the presumption] operated against the person who is able to 
exercise the influence. . .  and, in my judgement, it would operate 
against every volunteer who claimed under him, and also against 
every person who claimed under him with notice o f the equity thereby 
created, or with notice o f the circumstances from which the court 
infers the equity. But, in my judgement, it would operate against no 
others; it would not operate against a person who is not shown to 
have taken with such notice o f the circumstances under which the 
deed was executed.87
It should also be observed that the right to have a trans­
action set aside for fraud or undue influence does not cease on 
the death of the defrauded or dependent party but passes to his 
representatives.88
In the opening paragraph o f this section it was suggested that 
a party may be permitted to retain the benefits derived even though 
unable to discharge the onus. This will be so where he can success­
fully plead laches and acquiescence. The action to impeach a trans­
action for undue influence is not one o f those to which the Statute
86 Huguenin v. Baseley (1807), 14 Ves. Jun. 274, at p. 289; 33 E.R. 526, at 
p. 532.
87 Bainbrigge v. Browne (1881), 18 Ch. D. 188, at p. 197.
88 Allcard v. Skinner (1887), 36 Ch. D. 145 (C.A.), at p. 187.
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o f Limitations in terms applies. But it does very closely resemble an 
action for money had and received where laches and acquiescence 
may be relied upon as a defence.89 Transactions liable to be set 
aside on the ground of undue influence have always been treated 
as voidable and not void. As with o ther transactions, the party 
seeking to avoid it must do so within a reasonable time. It is im­
portant to recognize, however, that the reasonable time is considered 
in reference not to the date o f the transaction but to the date at 
which the relation which invalidates the transaction ends. In other 
words, the party seeking relief must do so within a reasonable time 
after the removal o f the influence under which the transaction was 
undertaken.
If he does not the inference is strong, and if the lapse o f time is long 
the inference becomes inevitable and conclusive, that the donor is 
content not to call the gift in question, or, in other words, that he 
elects not to avoid it, or, what is the same thing in effect, that he 
ratifies and confirms it.9(>
Furtherm ore, where the plaintiff's ignorance as to his rights is the 
result o f his own resolution not to inquire into them, such ignorance 
will not be an answer to an equitable defence based on laches and 
acquiescence.91
The scope o f this paper does not permit an  inquiry into the 
questions of “ total failure o f consideration” and “restitutio in 
intergrum". However, it may be pointed out that in setting aside 
transactions because o f an unrebutted presumption o f undue in­
fluence the courts are not unmindful o f possible equities in the 
defendant. For example, in Allcard v. Skinner it was held that the 
plaintiff, who had been a member o f an Anglican sisterhood, would 
have been entitled to have her gift to the sisterhood set aside were 
it not for her laches and acquiescence. In such event, however, she 
would have been permitted to recover only that part o f the donated 
property which the sisterhood still possessed. And in Wright v. 
Vanderplank the defendant was held entitled to retain a certain 
percentage of the rents which he had received from property con­
veyed to him by his daughter (the plaintiff’s deceased wife), by way 
o f allowance for her education and his expenditure on her behalf.
It would seem that the ultimate effect o f the presum ption may 
just be to recover to the plaintiff such benefits conferred as appear, 
in the circumstances, to be excessive or for the retention o f which
89 Ibid., at p. 186.
90 Ibid., at p. 187. See also Wright v. Vanderplank (1856), 8 D.M . & G. 133;
44 E R. 340, and M itchell v. Homfray (1881), 8 Q .B.D. 592.
91 Allcard v. Skinner (1887), 36 Ch. D. 145 (C.A.), at p. 188.
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the party so benefited is unable to show justifiable grounds. To 
the extent that this is so the potential hardships inflicted by the 
doctrine will be mitigated.
Summary and Conclusion
1. If the person seeking to avoid a transaction can show that 
there was a relationship presumed to be one o f confidence between 
him and the o ther party or between him and the person at whose 
instance the transaction took place, there is a presum ption that 
the confidence was abused.
2. A precisely similar presum ption o f abuse o f confidence ensues 
from p roof o f the existence o f a relationship which, though not 
presumed to be one o f confidence, was in fact one in which one 
party confided in the other, and the transaction regarded some 
m atter in respect o f which there was that confidence.
3. The doctrine was developed in equity for reasons o f public 
policy and in the light o f the great difficulty involved in proving 
the undue influence.
4. The immediate effect o f the presum ption is to place upon the 
party seeking to uphold the transaction the onus o f proving that 
the confidential relation had ceased, that the party conferring the 
benefit had com petent independent advice, o r that the bargain 
was fair.
5. The fact that there was no abuse o f confidence will assist the 
defendant in discharging the onus but will not prevent the presum p­
tion from arising.
6. Where the presum ption is not rebutted the impugned trans­
action will be set aside both as regards the party thereto and third 
parties deriving benefits thereunder. However, third parties who 
acquire such benefits for value and without knowledge o f the in­
fluence exerted will be protected.
It would seem to be beyond question that persons in a state 
o f dependence are as susceptible to undue influence today as they 
ever were. Similarly, the task o f proving undue influence is probably 
as onerous as it ever has been. Therefore, there would be no merit 
in a suggestion that the doctrine is obsolete and should be dis­
regarded. That is not to say, however, that the doctrine is not open 
to criticism and could not be rendered more equitable in application.
The obvious criticism o f the rule is that it, like the Statute o f 
F rauds and much o f  the law regarding infants’ contracts, may 
provide the incubator in which fraud may flourish and grow. Thus,
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it may have the effect o f inflicting considerable hardship on entirely 
innocent defendants. O f course, the courts are not unmindful o f 
this possibility. In Bradley v. Crittenden,92 Lam ont J. observed tha t:
The rule o f equity which places on the donee the burden of  
proving both the gift and the independence o f the donor’s will in 
making it, may be a harsh one and, in individual cases, may lead to 
hardship. The courts, however, have found it necessary to maintain 
it in order to prevent those in a position to exercise undue influence 
from taking advantage o f their position under circumstances in which 
proof thereof would be impossible.
In the course o f this study it has been shown that modifications 
have taken place in several areas which render the doctrine less 
stringent in its application and effect than was the case in the days 
o f Lord Eldon who, if he may not be regarded as the “ father o f 
the presum ption” , may certainly be considered to be its most ardent 
propagator. Further to these one may suggest that the courts guard 
against any undue extension o f the class of relations in which 
confidence will be presumed, and that a high standard o f proof be 
maintained regarding the repose o f confidence where it is not 
presumed. Finally, it is to be hoped that in determining the benefits 
which a plaintiff is entitled to recover, due regard will be had for 
the equities o f the defendant.
92 [1932] S.C.R. 552, at p. 569.
